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Preface 
 
The outcome document of the 2005 United Nations World Summit called on countries 
to prepare national development strategies, taking into account the international 
development goals agreed in the various United Nations Summits and Conferences of 
the past two decades. In order to assist countries in this task, the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) commissioned a series of notes 
for policy-makers and policy-shapers both in the government and civil society, in 
major and  interconnected areas relevant to the formulation of national development 
strategies: macroeconomic and growth policies, trade policy, investment and 
technology policies, financial policies, social policy and state-owned enterprise 
reform. The preparation o f the notes received generous funding in part from the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Colleagues from UNDP also 
provided helpful suggestions for and comments on the notes.   
 
The policy notes, authored by experts in these fields, draw on the experience and 
dialogues of the United Nations in the economic and social areas, complemented by 
outside knowledge. The notes provide concrete suggestions on the means to achieve 
at the national level, the internationally-agreed development goals synthesized in the 
United Nations Development Agenda. The policy notes are intended to provide those 
at the country level who shape and set policies, with a range of possible alternatives to 
the standard policy solutions that have prevailed over the past two decades, rather 
than to prescribe any single course of action. The notes serve to help countries take 
advantage of and expand their policy space - their effective room for maneuver in 
formulating and integrating national economic, social, and environmental polic ies.  
 
I encourage readers to see these notes as complementary inputs into the debate at the 
country level on development challenges faced and the policies needed to meet them. 
The issues chosen are vital pieces of the policy mosaic that underlies national 
development strategies, which are ultimately geared to achieving sustained economic 
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I.  INTRODUCTION: OBJECTIVES
* 
Successful development is not just the growth of productivity and per capita GDP, but 
also ensuring that the pattern of growth is inclusive, delivers broad-based 
improvement in the quality of life, and contributes to human development. A National 
Development Strategy, which includes policies that apply to and take account of the 
specific features and role of individual sectors, must tailor those policies to achieve 
the objectives of both growth and human development. This Policy Note discusses the 
financial policies that can be used to influence, complement and regulate the activities 
of financial agents to realize these twin objectives. 
The financial sector can serve as a significant catalyst to growth by agglomerating the 
savings of different agents of varying economic strength and allocating it between 
competing demands for funds. Given the incremental output that can be obtained 
from a unit of investment, growth in any period depends on the share of national 
income devoted to investment. Many factors influence the incentives to invest and, 
therefore, the level and structure of intended investments. However, some or a 
substantial share of those intentions may remain unrealized, even when potentially 
viable, because of lack of access to the capital needed to finance such investments or 
the insurance needed to guard against unforeseen risk. This has obvious implications 
for growth. 
It also affects the realization of human development objectives. Access to financial 
markets is influenced by the perceptions of creditors, financial investors and insurers 
regarding the reputation and risk profile of their clients and the adequacy of the 
collateral they can provide. Hence, it is the poorly endowed and the poor who are 
most often denied access to these markets, reducing the contribution they make to 
growth as well as the benefits they derive from it. Thus, the challenge of inclusiveness 
is substantial in the case of the financial sector, making this a crucial objective to be 
addressed when seeking to plug gaps in the structure of the sector, guide the 
behaviour of its actors and influence the outcomes of its operations. 
Financial sector operations have differential impacts across groups, regions and 
individuals, even in t imes of financial stringency and/or crisis that result from 
developments within the financial sector itself. As discussed below, features specific 
to the financial sector and its activities make it prone to fragility and crisis. As and 
when such fragility arises and results in partial or systemic crisis, its effects are not 
merely damaging to growth, but also impact on those with limited or no access to the 
financial sector in the first place and are least able to deal with these effects. Those 
suffering financial exclusion are not insulated from the effects of financial fragility. 
Intervention to identify and ameliorate fragility and pre-empt crises is a must. 
Finally, since the financial sector includes institutions and agents involved in 
mediating the flow of foreign capital and savings into the country, their practices have 
implications for the volume and pattern of foreign capital inflow. If the volume, 
structure and maturity of such flows are not regulated, they could increase external 
vulnerability and trigger currency and financial crises, as illustrated by periodic 
                                                  
* This Policy Note has been prepared by C.P. Chandrasekhar of the Centre for Economic Studies and 
Planning, School of School Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. All comments 
and queries can be sent to esa@un.org  7 
episodes of such crises in a number of developing countries. Financial policies must 
also deal with these potential dangers. 
This Policy note identifies policies that can help transform financial agents and 
markets into instruments of inclusive growth, while ensuring that their presence 
and/or operations do not render the system fragile and crisis-prone in the long run.  
Four broad motives should guide the design of such policies: 
1.  to ensure  availability of finance at costs commensurate with prospective 
returns to key sectors, projects and agents from a development point of view. 
2.  to ensure the financial structure does not exclude important sectors of the 
economy or large sections of the popula tion when such access is required to 
finance viable productive investment and emergency consumption needs. 
3.  to minimize the risk that the behaviour of financial agents could result in 
losses for savers holding financial assets or deposits. 
4.  to pre-empt finan cial practices that lead to closure of financial firms and 
increased fragility of the financial system, and that result in macroeconomic 
instability. 
II.  NEED FOR AND CONSTRAINTS ON 
FINANCIAL INTERVENTI ON 
Policies of intervention are justified because markets often: 
a)  do not deliver the results needed to advance the objectives of growth and 
equity, and 
b)  contribute to widening the distance between actual outcomes and desired 
goals. 
Financial policies are needed because financial markets are not like those for other 
goods and services. A loan or an insurance contract is not a contemporaneous trade, 
but a payment made by one party in lieu of an actual or contingent return in the future 
(Stiglitz 1991).  
Information is central to the functioning of financial markets. Savers need information 
on the viability and practices of financial intermediaries; intermediaries need 
information on the health and motivations of entities they lend to; and borrowers need 
information on the options they have when seeking credit. 
In practice, information tends to be incomplete and asymmetric in distribution. This 
has important implications:  
•  Borrowers are heterogeneous in terms of the probability of default, but banks 
cannot perfectly judge the probability of default of each borrower. Lending 
then cannot be determined by the choice of the best project but must involve 
screening based on incomplete information.  
•  Incomplete and asymmetric information also makes monitoring difficult. This 
could, for example, encourage managers to divert profits to managerial perks 
and investment in management and skills that strengthens their own market 
position, rather than serve the interests of lenders and equity investors.  8 
•  Conventionally, such problems are seen as increasing the possibilities of 
adverse selection, moral hazard and financial fragility. 1  
Confronted with such problems banks may ration credit and financial investors may 
hold back credit or equity investment. They may also simultaneously raise interest 
rates to provide for higher risk, resulting in the exclusion of some borrowers and the 
inclusion of investors in risky projects that promise high returns.  
Financial markets are also prone to failure because of the public goods characteristics 
of information which agents must acquire and process (Stiglitz, 1993; Rodrik, 1998). 
Once gathered, information can be used by all simultaneously, and it is difficult to 
completely prevent others from accessing that information without paying a price. 
Individual shareholders tend to refrain from investing money and time in acquiring 
information about managements, hoping that others would do so instead and knowing 
that all shareholders, including themselves, benefit from the information garnered.  
As a result there may be inadequate investment in information and poor monitoring, 
leading to risky decisions and malpractice. Financial firms wanting to reduce or avoid 
monitoring costs may just follow other, possibly larger, financial firms in making 
their investments, leading to what has been observed as the “herd i nstinct” 
characteristic of financial players. This not merely limits access to finance for some 
agents, but could lead to over-lending to some entities whose failure could have 
systemic effects. The prevalence of informational externalities aggravates some of 
these problems. Malpractice in a particular bank leading to failure may trigger fears 
among depositors in other banks, resulting in a run on deposits there. 
Finally, disruptions may occur because expected private returns differ from social 
returns in many activities. This could result in a situation where the market undertakes 
unnecessary risks in search of high returns. Typical examples are lending for 
investments in stocks or real estate. Loans to these sectors can be at extremely high 
interest rates because the returns in these sectors are extremely volatile and can touch 
extremely high levels. Since banks accept real estate or securities as collateral, 
borrowing to finance speculative investments in stock or real estate can spiral. This 
activity thrives due to the belief that losses can be transferred to the lender through 
default, and lenders are confident of government support in case of a crisis. This 
could feed a speculative spiral that can lead to a collapse of the bubble and bank 
failures. 
As a result of all this, financial markets are characterized by features that almost 
inevitably result in the deviation of actual results from desired outcomes. Some 
combination of regulation to correct for potential market failure and creation of 
special institutions is therefore necessary. However, while government intervention is 
an appropriate response, shaping the nature of that intervention may not be easy. 
Governments may be the best agents for dealing with problems of incomplete markets 
and coordination  failure, but the problems of screening clients and monitoring 
                                                  
1  To quote Arestis (2005): “ Adverse selection r efers to cases when selection is likely to produce 
adverse results. In the market for loans, for example, the problem refers to borrowers who may not be 
able to repay their loans; they use the loans for excessively risky investments, but lenders do not know 
about them due to lack of information. Moral hazard describes a situation where the  borrower acts 
“immorally”  – that is, in a way that is not in the best interest of the lenders who possess incomplete 
information. For example,  depositors due to incomplete information cannot observe the high risks 
banks may undertake, which encourages unscrupulous behaviour.” 9 
managers, even if government servants, remain. Moreover, decision-makers as 
individuals may be driven by private incentives and can use the excuse of pursuing 
social goals to cover up bad judgment or malpractice. Political favouritism and 
corruption may take their toll. 
For example, many development banks set up to direct credit to specific sectors or 
target groups have lent money to projects that were neither commercially nor socially 
profitable or to have inadequately executed their mandate. Even a seemingly 
successful development bank like BNDES has been faulted for lending mainly to 
large enterprises. Sometimes such occurrences are the result of bad judgment. But the 
issue of authority or straightforward corruption, resulting in state organizations 
becoming the site for private accumulation by redistributing wealth from the 
government and/or the poor to the rich and/or a powerful elite, has also played a role. 
However, given the arguments that warrant intervention in the first instance, a return 
to the market may not be the best alternative. While choosing the appropriate mix 
between intervention and the market is necessary, the problems of public governance 
can in the final analysis be resolved  only through the creation of transparent and 
participative institutional structures, allowing public monitoring of the monitors 
through parliament and other democratic bodies.  
III.  DEFINING THE AMBIT OF A 
FINANCIAL STRATEGY 
Given the objectives laid out earlier, the financial policies that need to be formulated 
are those that: 
•  determine the contours of the financial structure (in terms of markets, 
institutions and instruments); 
•  regulate the activities of financial agents and entities, and 
•  utilize elements of the structure to realize pre-specified goals. 
This definition of the ambit of “financial policy” explicitly excludes those financial 
interventions that are not sectoral but macroeconomic in nature, and are dealt with in 
Macroeconomic and Growth Policies in this series of Policy notes. For example, the 
government can be considered the grand financial intermediary in any economy, 
inasmuch as it absorbs, through taxation, a part of the money incomes and, through 
borrowing, draws on the savings of the private sector, part of which is transferred to 
entities needing funds for investment purposes. Through these means the government 
can seek  to ensure the realization in the financial realm of desired rates of savings and 
a desired allocation of that savings. However, the government is not a financial 
intermediary, and is normally not an agent seeking to make a profit from the 
difference between the cost of funds and the returns on subsequent transfers. Hence, 
the extent to which the government can and should resort to such “intermediation” is 
not considered the ambit of financial, but fiscal, policy. While there is a need to 
coordinate fiscal and financial policies, they are conceptually and practically 
different. 10 
Similarly, the credit-creating behaviour of the banking system as a whole and the 
interest rate structure it adopts in practice are not treated as strictly “financial sector” 
concerns, but monetary policy issues. This  Policy note restricts consideration of 
financial policies to those directly affecting the behaviour of financial entities, though 
such behaviour is circumscribed by central bank’s “monetary policy”. However, there 
is no sharp line separating monetary policy from financial policy. This is also true of 
policies relating to inflows of funds from abroad as recorded in the capital account of 
the balance of payments in the form of debt, portfolio inflows and foreign direct 
investment. While these are determined by the capital account policies of the 
government, some or all of these flows tend to influence the functioning of the 
financial system and the liquidity available. 
The above discussion suggests that the fiscal and monetary policy of the government 
and its policies with respect to cross-border flows of foreign and domestic capital are 
prior to and should influence and shape its financial sector policies. This need not be 
Box 1 
Financial Liberalisation and Macroeconomic Policy 
Over the last two to three decades, many developing countries, intent on attracting foreign 
capital flows, have liberalised policies governing the presence and activities of foreign 
financial firms in their domestic financial sectors. One likely consequence that has received 
considerable attention is an increase in financial fragility and the likelihood of currency and 
financial crises. The impact on fiscal and monetary policy has received less attention. 
Consider a country that succeeds in attracting large inflows of foreign capital after financial 
liberalisation. If the economy is unable to immediately absorb these flows, there is an excess 
supply of foreign exchange in domestic markets that could lead to an appreciation in the value 
of the domestic currency, which in turn adversely affects export competitiveness. 
To deal with this, central banks often purchase dollars (say) and accumulate them as reserves. 
This increases the demand for foreign exchange and moderates the pressure on the domestic 
currency to appreciate. However, this also increases the foreign exchange assets of the central 
bank; its corollary is an increase in its liabilities, implying an increase in money supply. To 
‘sterilise’ the effects of its increased holding of foreign exchange assets, the central bank often 
chooses to reduce its holding of domestic credit instruments. Since this consists largely of 
government debt, the net result is a reduction in the holding and accretion of government debt 
with the central bank. 
To accommodate this need to reduce domestic currency assets enforced by the increase in 
foreign currency assets, three supportive policies are pursued:  
i.   the fiscal deficit of the government is sought to be pruned, to reduce its overall borrowing 
requirement;  
ii.  to the extent that the government chooses to borrow it is forced to increasingly rely on 
higher cost credit from the “open market” rather than borrowing from the central bank, 
and  
iii.  the central bank is sought to be insulated from fiscal developments, by making it 
autonomous of the government in the sense that it need not respond positively when 
subjected to additional credit demands from the government. 
However, the central bank is not truly “autonomous” since it is forced to purchase 
autonomous flows of foreign exchange into the country to prevent currency appreciation. As 
and when it exhausts its available stock of government securities through sterilising sales, it 
will find that its assets and liabilities, hence the volume of money supply, are influenced by 
movements of foreign capital. This loss of control over the supply of money implies a loss of 
monetary sovereignty. 11 
the sequence in practice. Very often, governments begin by making changes in their 
financial sector policies, which in turn necessitate adjustments in their monetary and 
fiscal policy stance (See Box 1). Therefore, the discussion here has implications for 
efforts to establish  an appropriate macroeconomic policy framework. 
Is more, better? 
Often, when designing policies of financial intervention, governments are advised that 
financial development as measured by the extent of financial deepening (the ratio of 
financial to material wealth) and/or the degree of financial intermediation (the share 
of financial assets of financial institutions in the value of all financial assets) is an 
unqualified good. This implies that any scheme of intervention that restrains the 
proliferation of financial markets, institutions and instruments is inappropriate. 
However, there is no reason to expect a linear and positive relationship between 
financial deepening and increased financial intermediation, on the one hand, and 
growth and equity on the other. Financial deepening and increased financial 
intermediation have their uses when economies develop and become more complex, 
but they are not virtues in themselves. In all economies, the value of financial 
proliferation depends on its ability to ease transactions, facilitate investment and 
direct financial resources to the projects that yield the best social returns. This implies 
that there are financial systems and policies that shape these characteristics in ways 
most appropriate for each country at specific stages of development. Autonomously 
evolved financial systems may not be the most appropriate, since they can reflect the 
imperfections and inequities of the economic base from which they emerge (Box 2). 
Box 2 
Unregulated Financial Sectors  
Can Be Inappropriate 
In practice, ther e are a number of reasons why autonomously evolved and unregulated 
financial sectors can be inappropriate from a d evelopmental point of view. For example, 
informal financial structures in backward and predominantly agrarian economies reflect the 
unequal distribution of assets and economic power and, because of the inter-linking of land, 
labour and credit markets, operate in ways that result in usurious moneylending inimical to 
productive investment. Similarly, autonomously evolved financial structures that reflect a 
high degree of interconnectedness between an oligopolistic industrial sector and a 
numerically small set of financial intermediaries are known to result in an excessive 
concentration of credit and in investment choices influenced by considerations that put at 
risk the savings of uninformed depositors. According to Diaz-Alejandro (1986:13-14), 
“between 1975 and 1982, Chile went from a financially shallow economy, where inflation 
had wiped out the real value of debt, to an excessively financially deep economy where 
creditors owned a very large share of real wealth, a clear case of 'too much debt and too little 
equity'.” This was because linkages “between banks and firms, which were hardly arms' 
length, were responsible for the high use of debt by private firms. In Chile by late 1982 
private firms were more indebted than state enterprises; within the private sector, extreme 
indebtedness was found among those that controlled banks.” By late 1982, the two largest 
business groups in Chile controlled the principal insurance companies, mutual funds, 
brokerage houses, the largest private company pension funds and the two largest private 
commercial banks. Many banks had lent one quarter or more of their resources to affiliates. 
Such concentration of credit in related enterprises not only results in exclusion of other 
potential borrowers, but also in lending driven by criteria other than economic or even social 
returns and in overexposure that can lead to default. 12 
This is of relevance since private financial intermediaries are controlled by entities 
that risk a small volume of their own capital to leverage large volumes of “outside” 
savings that they are then responsible for allocating. This makes it imperative that 
governments act to ensure that resources mobilised by financial intermediaries are 
put to the best possible use from a social – and not purely private – point of view and 
that financial systems are relatively safe for investors. 
 
IV.  FINANCE FOR GROWTH 
THROUGH DEVELOPMENT BANKING 
The objective then should be to ensure that the processes of financial expansion occur 
in the context of a policy regime that can use that expansion as the instrument to 
realize a wide range of goals such as faster and more broad-based growth and human 
development. In particular, the delivery of credit to targeted clients, in adequate 
amounts and at an appropriate interest rate is crucial. This is because in developing 
countries, especially the poorer amongst them, banking, broadly defined, constitutes 
the principal segment of the formal financial sector.2 Further, even though availability 
of credit in itself cannot be expected to spur investment in a supply-leading manner, 
wherever the inducement to invest and, therefore, demand for credit, exists, lack of 
access can prevent the full realization of the potential for investment and growth. 
Realizing target credit-deposit ratios  
Thus the first objective of policy should be to ensure that credit is available for all 
bankable projects which have attracted investor interest. A fundamental problem with 
the inevitable process of financial intermediation by banks and other financial 
institutions is the mismatch between the maturity (pre-specified period of lock-in) and 
liquidity (possibility of encashment) characteristics of the liabilities of financial 
intermediaries and of the loan-demands they face. As a result, financial firms may 
hold back on credit provision and show a preference for “investment” in gilts, such as 
government securities, rather than in the provision of credit. This tendency could be 
aggravated by collateral demands by overcautious lenders which prospective 
borrowers may not be able to meet. In sum, there could be a process of credit 
rationing that implies an inadequate degree of aggregate credit provision. 
Any growth-oriented financial policy regime must therefore ensure an adequate 
degree of credit availability. An important instrument in realising that objective is the 
specification of target credit-deposit ratios that imply an adequate degree of 
intermediation from a development point of view, to be achieved by the banks. This 
would also put pressure on banks to reduce their intermediation costs to accommodate 
lower spreads associated with larger lending. Macroeconomic circumstances, such as 
recessionary conditions, may on occasion constrain lending by the banks. If this is the 
case, then low credit-deposit ratios should be treated as a signal for the adoption of 
policies to revive the economy, since banks cannot be made to bear the burden o f 
circumstances beyond their control. 
                                                  
2 This segment includes not only commercial banks, but also cooperative credit institutions, specialised 
development banks aimed at supporting investments in large and medium industry, small scale 
enterprises and agriculture, specialised refinance institutions and, more recently, microfinance 
institutions. 13 
Creating long-term credit  
Commercial banks, which mobilise finance through savings and time deposits, 
acquire liabilities that are individually small and protected from income and capital 
risk, are of short maturity and are substantially liquid in nature. On the other hand, the 
credit required for most projects tends to be individually large, subject to income and 
capital risk and substantially illiquid in nature. Consequently, commercial banks 
conventionally focus on  providing working capital credit to industry. This is 
collateralized by firms’ inventories of raw materials, final products and work -in-
progress. Though this can involve provision of credit in relatively large volumes, with 
significant income and credit risk and a degree of illiquidity, it implies a lower degree 
of maturity and liquidity mismatch than lending for capital investment. This makes 
banks less suited to lending for capital investment. 
As noted elsewhere (United Nations, 2005), left to themselves, private financial 
markets in developing countries usually fail to provide enough long-term finance to 
undertake the investments necessary for economic and social development. As a 
result, firms in developing countries often hold a smaller portion of their total debt in 
long-term instruments than firms in developed countries. Private institutions may fail 
to provide such finance because of high default risks that cannot be covered by high 
enough risk premiums because such rates are not viable. In other instances, failure 
may be because of the unwillingness of financial agents to take on certain kinds of 
risk or because anticipated returns to private agents are much lower than the social 
returns in the investment concerned (Stiglitz, 1994). 
This creates a shortfall in funds for long-term investments. One way to deal with this 
problem is to encourage the growth of equity markets. This is attractive because, 
unlike in the case of debt, risk is shared between the financial investor and the 
entrepreneur. This enhances the viability of the firm in periods of recession. However, 
the evidence shows that even in developed countries equity markets play a relatively 
small role in mobilizing capital for new investments. 
To cover the shortfall in funds required for long-term investment, developing 
countries need to and have created  development banks with the mandate to provide 
long-term credit at terms that render such investment sustainable. According to an 
OECD estimate quoted by Eshag  (1983), there were about 340 such banks in some 80 
developing countries in the mid-1960s. Over half of these banks were state -owned 
and funded by the exchequer; the remainder had mixed ownership or were private. 
Handicapped by colonial legacies, international inequalities and various systemi c 
biases, these kinds of institutions are a ‘must’ for developing countries. Any national 
strategy of modernisation in a mixed -economy framework must provide for the 
establishment of institutions of this kind. However, it is best to create separate 
development banks to provide long-term capital at near-commercial rates and “policy 
banks” to provide credit to special areas such as agriculture or the small scale sector 
where interest rates have to be subsidized and grace periods have to be longer. This 
allows different criteria to be applied to the evaluation of the performance of these 
banks, with profitability a more important consideration in the case of the former.  
Since development banks play a role normally bypassed by commercial banks and as 
they are funded by the state (with deep pockets), there is always the possibility that 
lending to projects that are neither commercially viable nor socially profitable may 
occur for reasons other than errors of judgment. Governance mechanisms to ensure 
transparent p rocedures, adequate disclosure and participative monitoring involving 14 
oversight by democratically elected bodies are crucial. Such mechanisms should not 
be diluted or passed up on the grounds that they undermine managerial autonomy.  
Ensuring sectoral distribution  
Growth requires not just an adequate volume of credit but an appropriate distribution 
of such credit. For example, certain sectors – infrastructure being the most obvious – 
are characterised by significant “economy-wide externalities”. That is, their presence 
is a prerequisite for and a facilitator of growth in other sectors. But the infrastructure 
sector is usually characterised by lumpy investments, long gestation lags, higher risk 
and lower profit. Banks would be wary of lending to such projects, given the maturity 
and liquidity mismatch involved. Such reticence would be greater in economies with 
a predominantly private banking system. If private – rather than social – returns drive 
the allocation of financial savings, these sectors would receive inadequate capital, 
even though their capital-intensive nature demands that a disproportionate share be 
diverted to them. Given the “economy-wide externalities” associated with such 
sectors, inadequate investments in infrastructure obviously constrain the rate of 
growth. Hence, specialised policy development banks are needed, with sources of 
finance other than deposits by small savers (Box 3). While such institutions can be 
                                                  
3 VPSC was established in 1999. In 2002, it already had 539 to 600 branches all over the country, and 
has been a good and fast-growing venue to mobilize rural savings. There are around half a million 
deposit accounts with outstanding deposits at D3.8 billion (around US$250 million).  
Box 3 
Development Finance in Vietnam 
In Vietnam, the government has continued with targeted lending for specific purposes even 
after the adoption of financial liberalization policies. This involved the creation of a special 
Development Assistance Fund (DAF) in 200, separate from the commercial banking system, 
which had as its objectives: (i) the provision of subsidized state loans for medium to long-
term investments in priority sectors such as infrastructure, heavy industry and public services, 
(ii) provision of interest-rate support and investment guarantees for chosen projects, and (iii) 
provision of short-term export promotion credit. Support in these forms can go to both private 
and state-owned enterprises, taking account of both commercial and policy criteria, such as 
encouraging investment in underdeveloped areas, preferential sectors, and projects related to 
health, education, culture and sport. The DAF has branches in all sixty-one provinces, with a 
registered capital of five billion dong (US$326.8 million). Before 2002, the Office of the 
Prime Minister determined allocation of funds. Funds came from the Social Insurance Fund, 
the Sinking Fund, the Vietnam Postal Service Savings Company (VPSC),3 the government 
budget, loan repayments, and official development assistance (ODA). Since 2002, the DAF 
has been expected to mobilize its own resources. It continues to draw funds from the sources 
mentioned above, through negotiation. If funds come from the government budget, this 
usually involves issuance of investment bonds. 
Outstanding credit from the DAF in 2001 to 2002, and loan disbursements in 2002 and 2003 
grew much faster than total domestic credit to the economy. As a result disbursements 
through the DAF amounted to an increasing share of domestic credit, reaching 24 percent in 
2002, equal to 3.3 per cent of GDP. Over time, the DAF has emerged as the largest financial 
intermediary in Vietnam for channelling domestic and foreign funds to investment activities 
(Weeks et al., 2003). 15 
funded by the government or the central bank, government guarantees on borrowing 
by these entities is need ed if adequate capital is to be mobilized. 
Development banks of this kind can help address the fact that local industrialists may 
not have adequate capital to invest in capacity of the requisite scale in more capital -
intensive industries characterised by s ignificant economies of scale. They help 
promote such ventures through their lending and investment practices, and often 
provide technical assistance to their clients. Given the inadequate development of 
equity and long-term debt markets in developing countries, these institutions soon 
account for an important share of external finance for the private sector. 
Leveraging capital provision  
to influence investment decision and performance  
The need for a growth-oriented financial policy to extend credit to special sectors 
such as infrastructure is an important component of a larger requirement in economies 
with predominantly private investment decision makers: the need to ensure that the 
pattern of production is geared to maximising growth.  In economies with a n 
important role for private agents in investment decision-making, market signals 
determine the allocation of resources for investment and, therefore, the demand for 
and allocation of savings intermediated by financial enterprises. This can result in 
“short-termism” of various kinds, resulting in inadequate investment in sectors with 
significant “external” effects and long-term potential from the point of view of 
growth. In addition, the private-profit driven allocation of savings and investment 
could direct investment to capital- and import-intensive sectors, adversely affecting 
the balance of payments and the employment elasticity of output growth in the 
process. This could constrain the pace of growth, as well as the pursuit and efficacy of 
the poverty reduction effort. 
Realizing a growth-oriented pattern of production of goods and services requires the 
state to guide the allocation of investment. Since independent and atomistic decision 
makers cannot have the economy-wide and “social” seeing power to undertake such 
coordination and targeting, the state must play a role in overcoming market failure 
resulting from inadequate coordination. One way to do this is to use the financial 
sector as an instrument for investment coordination and targeting. Even in developing 
countries that choose outward-oriented strategies  or are forced to choose a more 
mercantilist strategy of growth based on rapid acquisition of larger shares in segments 
of the world market for manufactures, the relevant segments have to be identified by 
an agency  other than individual firms. Experience indicates that the state has the 
capacity to assess and match global opportunities and economy-wide capabilities. 
Hence, though its financial policies, the state must ensure an adequate flow of credit 
at favourable interest rates to these entities so that they can not only make investments 
in frontline technologies and internationally competitive scales of production, but also 
have the means to sustain themselves during the long period when they  expand 
market share. The state must not merely play the role of investment coordinator; it 
needs to use the financial system to direct investment to sectors and technologies at 
appropriate scales of production. Equity investments and directed credit are important 
instruments in such a state-led or state-influenced development trajectory . 
Executing this role requires leveraging lending to influence investment decisions and 
monitor the performance of borrowers. Financial institutions in backward countries 
have to u ndertake entrepreneurial functions, such as determining the scale of 16 
investment, the choice of technology and the markets to be targeted by industry, and 
extension functions, such as offering technical support to the farming community. 
Stated otherwise, financial policies may not help directly  to  increase the rate of 
savings and ensure that the available ex ante savings are invested, but they can be 
used to influence the  financial structure so as to ensure that lending leads to 
productive investment that accelerates growth and makes such lending sustainable. 
Development and commercial banks can also monitor corporate governance and 
performance on behalf of all stakeholders, rather than rely on the system of indirect 
monitoring resulting from the discipline exerted by the threat of takeover in stock 
markets ostensibly prevalent in the United States and the United Kingdom. The 
effectiveness of the latter option is limited. Moreover, it is not available in most 
developing countries where equity markets are poorly developed and most firms are 
not listed. 
In practice, development banks do not always leverage their capital-provision role to 
intervene effectively in management in all contexts. In some countries, despite a 
significant role as providers of finance, development banks adopt a passive role with 
respect to technological or managerial decisions of private borrowers, avoiding a role 
that such institutions are expected to play. This is also the loss of an opportunity, not 
only to exploit the economies of scale associated with investment in knowledge skills 
of certain kinds, but also to coordinate investment decisions in systems dominated by 
private decision-making. 
Role for differential interest rates  
Since one of the objectives of these actions is to guide investment to chosen sectors, 
the rate of interest on loans to favoured sectors may have to be lower than even the 
prime lending rate offered to the best borrowers, judged by credit-worthiness. That is, 
differentials in interest rates supported with subsidies or enabled by cross-
subsidization is part of a directed lending regime.  
Financial policies were an important component of the strategic policies pursued by 
countries like the Republic of Korea and Taiwan  Province of China on the way to 
competitive success (Wade, 1991; Amsden, 1989). These included  interest rate 
differentials and bank financing of private investment, resulting from the channelling 
of corporate finance through a still largely regulated banking system.  
Table 1 summarises some of the main financial policy options that can be used to 
accelerate growth. 18 V.  FINANCIAL POLICIES TO PROMOTE 
EQUITY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
When countries frame policies that determine their financial structures and influence 
the behaviour of domestic financial agents, the concern is not just with accelerating 
growth. As important is the need to ensure that such development is broad -based. An 
obvious prerequisite for this is that the coverage of lending, supervisory and 
developmental services of the financial sector must be near comprehensive. The 
creation of an inclusive financial sector, defined as one that provides “access to credit 
for all “bankable” people and firms, to insurance for all insurable people and firms 
and to savings and payments services for everyone” (United Nations 2006:1), should 
be among the prime objectives of financial policy. 
In practice, there is only limited access to the financial sector in many developing 
countries. According to recent estimates (United Nations, 2006), an average of 89.6 
per cent of the population in the 15 countries of the European Union have a bank or 
postal savings account. The comparable figure for the United States is 91.0 per cent. 
In contrast, in a set of ten developing 
countries or major cities in such countries, 
the figure varied from as low as 6.4 per 
cent to a maximum of 47 per cent (Table 
2). This is a matter of concern since, 
“access to a well-functioning financial 
system can economically and socially 
empower individuals, in particular poor 
people, allowing them to better integrate 
into the economy of their countries, 
actively contribute to their development 
and protect themselves against economic 
shocks (United Nations, 2006:4). As the 
World Economic and Social Survey 2005 
(United Nations, 2005:26) noted : “ This 
lack of access to finance has become a 
matter of wider development-related 
concern because deeper and more 
inclusive financial systems are linked to 
economic development and poverty alleviation.” 
Access to credit for women is worse than for men. Studies have shown that women 
entrepreneurs often face problems of gender bias, which can severely hamper women 
seeking small business credit. This happens despite evidence that women generally 
have a higher loan rep ayment rate than men. Women also tend to lack the collateral 
needed for loans, often due to social and legal disadvantages such as lower wage 
incomes or limitations on property ownership (UNCTAD, 2001:38). 
Inadequate region-, class- and unit-wise allocation is often the outcome of allocation 
driven purely by considerations of private profit rather than social returns. Credit 
allocation driven by private returns can aggravate the inherent tendency in markets to 
concentrate investible funds in the hands of a few large players in sectors delivering 
high private profits and to direct savings to already well-developed centres of 
economic activity. Besides resulting in excess exposure to certain sectors and 
Table 2 
Populations with a Savings Account  
in Selected  
Developing Countries/Locations 
Botswana   47 0  
Brazil (urban)   43 0  
Colombia (Bogotá)   39 0  
Djibouti   24 8  
Lesotho   17 0  
Mexico City   21 3  
Namibia   28 4  
South Africa   31 7  
Swaziland   35 3  
Tanzania   6 4  
Source: United Nations, 2006:2 20 
segments, this concentration of financial flows militates against broad-based 
development (Box 2). Consequently, financial policies are often designed to ensure 
adequate flows of capital to less developed areas of the economy and to 
disadvantaged sections of the population. 
Thus, financial exclusion is not just a matter of inadequate access for individuals, but 
for whole sectors such as agriculture or small-scale industry. As a result of such 
exclusion, financial flows can be mechanisms that significantly aggravate the biased 
developmental outcomes of the unequal distribution of assets. This occurs because the 
divergence between private returns and social returns varies across sectors, and 
private returns tend to be higher in sectors (say, real estate and the stock market) 
where social returns are low. It also occurs because financial intermediaries 
concentrate in their hands household savings, which tend to be a relatively high share 
of total savings in the system. If the allocation of these savings is governed by the 
private predilections of those who control or manage these intermediaries, the bias in 
allocations can be substantial and not necessarily always socially efficient. 
Further, in poor countries, where the pattern of effective demand is significantly 
influenced by the extent of inequality, market signals could direct credit to capital - 
and import-intensive sectors, the expansion of which may have limited effects on 
employment, incomes and poverty reduction. 
Box 4  
Financial Exclusion in India pre -Nationalization 
Features of financial exclusion were visible in India before the nationalization of major 
banks in 1969 and the promotion of a policy of social reorientation. 
First, the coverage of the branch network was unduly low compared with the size of the 
population  – an average of one branch office for 65,000 persons, whereas the developed-
country norm was one branch per 8,000 population. 
Second, the urban orientation of the banking system was obvious. At the end of June 1969, 
there were just 1,832 (or 22.2. per cent) out of 8,262 bank branches located in rural areas. 
This spread was only achieved because of the accelerated branch banking policy of the State 
Bank of India, which operated 629 branches in rural areas. 
Third, concentration was excessive even in urban areas. As of April 1969, there were 617 
towns without any commercial bank branch; of these, 444 were not served by any bank at 
all. Five metropolitan cities (Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, Madras and Ahmedabad) accounted 
for 46 per cent of total bank deposits and 65 per cent of total bank credit as at the end of 
1967. 
Fourth, the most disconcerting aspect of the banking structure was the sectoral distribution 
of bank credit. The share of agriculture in total bank advances in 1951 was 2.1 per cent; it 
had declined to 0.2 per cent by 1965-66. On the other hand, the share of industry in bank 
credit increased from 30.4 per cent in 1949 to 52.7 per cent in 1961 and further to 62.7 per 
cent in March 1966. 
Finally, the financial stake of the shareholders in banks was almost negligible. For major 
banks, paid-up capital constituted just about 1 per cent of total bank deposits (ICBP, 2006). 
As a result of such tendencies, a number of weaknesses afflict the banking system in 
developing countries, including those with relatively more developed financial 
systems, such as India (Box 4). They include:  
•  poor population coverage as measured by the ratio of bank branches, deposits 
and credit to the population; 
•  urban concentration; 21 
•  significant inequities in the sectoral allocation of credit, and 
•  excessive control over banks by industrial and commercial interests. 
Ensuring financial inclusion 
It is because of these outcomes associated with the operation of “self-organized” 
financial systems, that financial policies aimed at ensuring financial inclusion must be 
an important component of a national development strategy. In developing countries 
adopting  a mixed economy framework with significant private initiative and 
investment,  the financial sector has to play a major role in a system of “inclusive 
finance” by channelling credit at reasonable interest rates to units and agents, so as to 
ensure a degree of inter-sectoral, rural-urban, region-wise and asset size-wise balance 
in credit disbursal. In particular, it is necessary to ensure that financial flows reach 
sectors and sections that would otherwise be bypassed or neglected. 
Bank branching  
A basic requirement for such financial inclusion is widely accessible deposit and 
credit facilities, through banks, post offices and other institutions. While the post 
office can play a partial role, increasing the number and spread of bank branches is 
crucial. Most developing countries are underserved in terms of the number of bank 
branches per thousand of the population. Governments should adopt a scheme of 
branch licensing to ensure branching in  underserved areas or specify a ratio of 
branching in well-served and underserved areas, or of urban to rural branches, for 
example, that must be maintained. 
Preventing credit migration 
Bank branching in underserved areas, 
while helpful in from mobilising 
deposits in institutions belonging to the 
formal financial sector, is no guarantee 
of balanced regional credit dispersion. 
Deposits mobilised in rural areas or 
backward regions can be used by 
geographically diversified banks to 
provide credit to clients in urban areas 
or more developed regions. More 
extensive bank branching must be 
accompanied with guidelines to prevent 
excessive credit migration from less to 
more developed areas in the country 
(Box 5). 
Preventing credit concentration  
Given the incompleteness of 
information available to lenders, the 
adage that “nothing succeeds like 
success” would tend to hold. Agents 
with a longstanding relationship with a 
bank, a good track record and significant financial strength, may be favoured with a 
Box 5 
Preventing Credit Migration 
The United States passed  the Community 
Reinvestment Act in 1977,  which requires 
banks to provide credit to neighbourhoods in 
which they raise funds from deposits. This is 
enforced through the collection of data that 
banks are required to file, by postal zone, on 
the source of their deposits and the 
destination of their  loans, leases and other 
lines of credit. Other banking laws prohibit 
banks from denying credit on the basis of 
race, ethnicity, and gender. This explicit 
prohibition against discrimination, 
enforceable by bank regulators and by private 
lawsuits to recover damages, helps promote 
lending to those members of society. These 
banking laws promote the policy of inclusive 
finance, and they are supported on the 
grounds that discrimination is wrong and that 
banks should not drain savings from any area 
but instead be  responsible for mobilizing 
savings into credit for investment and 
consumption. 22 
disproportionate share of credit. This could lead to large individual loan contracts for 
such clients and to the accommodation of multiple applications from the same client. 
A concomitant would be the exclusion of other bankable and needy projects. While 
large, creditworthy borrowers should not be overly discriminated against, measures 
are needed to prevent their past success being a barrier to access for others. A simple 
way to deal with this likelihood is to institute a “ credit authorization scheme”, 
requiring banks to obtain prior authorisation  from a designated body  to grant credit 
above a particular level to any single party so as to align credit policy more closely 
with developmental objectives. The other is to set strict limits on credit provided to 
interlinked firms controlled by a single authority, which also helps reduce risk due to 
failures of a single set of agents. 
Directed credit  
Central to a framework of inclusive finance are policies aimed at pre-empting bank 
credit for selected sectors like agriculture and small-scale industry. Pre-emption can 
take the form of specifying that a certain proportion of lending should be directed at 
these sectors. In addition, through 
mechanisms such as the provision of 
refinance facilities, banks can be offered 
incentives to realise their targets. Directed 
credit programmes should also be 
accompanied by a regime of differential 
interest rates that ensure demand for credit 
from targeted sectors by cheapening the cost 
of credit. Such policies have been and are 
still used in developed countries as well 
(Box 6). 
Credit pre-emption, aimed at directing debt-
financed expenditures to specific sectors, 
can also be directly exploited by the state. 
In many instances, besides a cash reserve 
ratio, the central bank requires a part of the 
deposits of the banking system to be held in 
specified securities, including government 
securities. This ensures that banks are 
forced to make a definite volume of 
investment in debt issued by government 
agencies. Such debt can be used to finance 
expenditures warranted by the overall 
development strategy of the government, 
including its poverty alleviation component. 
Beyond a point, however, these roles have 
to  be dissociated from traditional 
commercial banks and located in specialized institutions. 
Institutional safeguards  
The need to ensure inclusion may be accepted by line officials, managers and 
directors, but the motivation to realise these objectives may n ot exist, resulting in 
slippages. Institutional mechanisms to ensure cognition and pursuit of this objective 
Box 6 
FarmerMac:  
Farm Credit System in  
the United States 
A lesson for developing countries from 
developed country experience can be 
found in U.S. financial policy for assuring 
adequate credit flows to its agricultural 
sector. The Federal Farm Loan Act of 
1916 established a nationwide Farm Credit 
System – a network of credit cooperatives 
– that have proven to be a reliable source 
of funding for farmers, ranchers and 
aquatic producers during good times as 
well a s bad. This includes 12 regional 
farm land banks whose original capital 
was supplied mostly by the government. 
Two related government-owned funding 
corporations raised money from capital 
markets by issuing bonds. These funds are 
lent to the network of credit banks and 
credit cooperatives at interest rates that 
reflect the government’s low cost of 
borrowing. In turn these funds are lent to 
rural producers and home-owners. It has 
proven to be low cost, stable and non-
cyclical. 23 
when making lending decisions are crucial. One form such a mechanism can take is a 
statutory requirement to constitute commercial bank boards with  representation for 
different stakeholders, including sectors normally neglected in credit provision, so as 
to monitor and ensure financial inclusion. 
Supply-leading role  
Finally, it is not enough for institutional mandates to ensure “financial inclusion”, to 
merely accept it as an objective, and wait for credible borrowers to arrive. Small, 
inexperienced and poor borrowers may neither be familiar with the borrowing options 
they have nor have the capacity to design and frame a project in ways that can render 
it successful and creditworthy. Inclusive banking, therefore, requires institutions that 
take on a supply-leading role, identifying potential entrepreneurs with bankable 
projects, helping them through the phases of project preparation and credit appraisal, 
and ensuring successful and timely implementation. The relationship should not end 
there either. Rather, the lending institution should use the leverage provided by  its 
support to  monitor the functioning of small and medium scale businesses to render 
them productive and financially sustainable. 
A case for public ownership 
Inclusive finance of this kind inevitably involves the spread of formal financial 
systems to areas where client densities are low and transaction costs are high. Further, 
to ensure sustainable credit up-take by disadvantaged groups, interest rates charged 
may have to diverge from market rates. This regime of differential or discriminatory 
interest rates may require policies of cross-subsidization and even government 
support to ensure the viability of chosen financial intermediaries. Intervention of this 
kind presumes a substantial degree of “social control” over commercial banks and 
development banking institutions.  
It implies that “social banking” involves a departure from conventional indicators of 
financial performance such as costs and profitability and requires the creation of 
regulatory systems that ensure that the “special status” of these institutions is not 
misused. In sum, “inclusive finance” is a regime is defined as much by the financial 
structure in place as by policies such as directed credit and differential interest rates. 
In particular, it involves a substantial measure of social regulation of banking. 
If instruments of social control of the kind discussed above prove inadequate to 
ensure compliance with financial inclusion guidelines, governments can use and have 
used public ownership of a significant section of the banking/financial system to 
ensure the realization of developmental and distributional objectives.  If an 
overwhelmingly dominant banking system has to play a role in directing savings and 
rendering the financial structure inclusive, the question of ownership and/or 
regulatory structure of the banking industry has to be addressed.  24 
This was recognized by governments 
in  many countries in Europe,  where 
banking development in the early post-
World W ar II period took account of 
the vital differences between banking 
and other industries. Recognizing the 
role  the banking industry could play, 
many countries with  predominantly 
capitalist economic structures thought 
it fit either to nationalize their banks or 
to subject them to r igorous 
surveillance and social control. France, 
Italy and Sweden are typical examples 
in this respect. Overall, even as late as 
the 1970s,  the state owned as much as 
40 per cent of the assets of the largest 
commercial and development banks in 
the industrialized countries (United 
Nations, 2005). An example of a more 
recent successful transition to inclusive 
finance through nationalization of  a 
significant part of the banking system 
is India post-1969 (Box 7). 
The declared  objectives  of public 
presence in and social regulation over 
banking are: 
•  to ensure a wider territorial and 
regional spread of the  branch 
network; 
•  to ensure better mobilization of financial savings by the formal sector through 
bank deposits; and 
•  to reorient credit deployment in favour of hitherto neglected or disadvantaged 
sections by reducing control by a few private entities. 
Public ownership of banks also serves a number of overarching objectives: 
•  It ensures the information flow and access needed to pre-empt fragility by 
substantially reducing any incompatibility in incentives driving bank 
managers, on the one hand, and bank supervisors and regulators, on the other.  
•  By subordinating the profit motive to social objectives, it allows the system to 
exploit the potential for cross subsidization and to direct credit, despite higher 
costs,  to targeted sectors and disadvantaged sections of society at different 
interest rates. This p ermits the fashioning of a system of inclusive finance that 
can substantially reduce financial exclusion.  
•  By giving the state influence over the process of financial intermediation, it 
allows the government to use the banking industry as a lever to advance the 
development effort. In particular, it allows for the mobilization of technical 
Box 7 
Public Ownership and  
Inclusive Finance in India 
India’s achievements with regard to financial 
sector development after bank nationalisation 
have been remarkable. There was a substantial 
increase in the geographical spread and 
functional reach of banking, with nearly 62,000 
bank branches in the country as of March 1991, 
of which over 35,000 (or over 58 per cent) were 
in rural areas. Along with this expansion of the 
bank branch network, steady increases were 
recorded in the share of rural areas in aggregate 
deposits and credit. From 6.3 per cent in 
December 1969, the share of rural deposits in 
the total rose to touch 15.5 per cent by March 
1991 and the rural share of credit rose from 3.3 
per cent to 15.0 per cent. More significantly, 
with the target credit-deposit (C-D) ratio set at 
60 per cent, the C-D ratios of rural branches 
touched 64-65 per cent on the basis of 
sanctions. Sectorally, a major achievement of 
the banking industry in the 1970s and 1980s 
was a decisive shift in credit deployment in 
favour of the agricultural sector. F rom an 
extremely low level at the time of bank 
nationalization, the credit share of the sector 
grew to nearly 11 per cent in the mid-1970s and 
to a peak of about 18 per cent (the official 
target) at the end of the 1980s (ICBP 2006). 25 
and scientific talent to deliver both credit and technical support to agriculture 
and the small-scale industrial sector. 
This multifaceted  role  for state-controlled banking allows credit to lead economic 
activity in chosen sectors, regions and segments of the population. It amounts to 
building a financial structure in anticipation of real sector activities, particularly in 
underdeveloped and under-banked regions of a country. 
Financial innovation for development 
Policy banking  
Financial inclusion requires not just social control over commercial banks, but the 
creation of special institutions such as “policy-oriented” development banks, 
cooperative credit organizations and specialized rural financial agencies. It may also 
require prescribing specific quantitative targets for managers of these institutions.  
Fundamentally, policy banking is required because, as noted above, private lenders 
are only concerned with the returns they receive. On the other hand, the total return to 
a project includes the additional surplus (or profit) accruing to the entrepreneur, and 
the non-pecuniary social returns accruing to society. The projects that offer the best 
return to the lender may not be those with the highest total expected return. As a 
result, good projects get rationed out, necessitating measures such as development 
banking or directed credit (Stiglitz 1994). 
In practice, financial intermediaries seek to match the demand for credit by adjusting 
not just interest rates, but also the terms on which credit is provided. Lending gets 
linked to collateral, and the nature and quality of that collateral is adjusted according 
to the nature of the borrower as well as supply and demand conditions in the credit 
market. Depending on the quantum and cost of funds available to the financial 
intermediaries, the market tends to ration out borrowers to differing extent. In such 
circumstances, borrowers rationed out because they are considered risky may not be 
the ones that are the least important from a social point of view. 
Policy banks are expected to focus on specific sectors such as the small-scale 
industrial sector, providing them with long-term finance and working capital at 
subsidised interest rates with longer grace periods, as well as offering training and 
technical assistance in areas like marketing. Similarly,  agricultural development 
banks, most of which are state-backed and funded, advance credit at subsidised rates 
to the agricultural sector, in particular to small and marginal farmers without the 
means to undertake much-needed investments. Given their low credit rating, these 
farmers are excluded from the normal lending of commercial banks and are forced to 
rely on “informal” sources, such as professional moneylenders, landlords and traders, 
at interest rates far exceeding those charged by commercial banks. 
These institutions must not be seen as a drain on the exchequer, except when they do 
not function according to accepted norms. Directed c redit has positive fiscal 
consequences. In contrast to subsidies, such credit reduces the demand on the 
government’s own revenues. This makes directed credit an advantageous option in 
developing countries faced with chronic budgetary difficulties that limit their ability 
to use budgetary subsidies to achieve a certain allocation of investible resources. 
To deal with these problems, countries must incorporate the following in their 
national development strategies: 26 
i.   Create and/or strengthen policy banks to provide credit to specified clients 
(often in targeted quantities) at interest rates which they can reasonably pay 
given their expected returns; 
ii.  Make it incumbent on policy banks to intervene in the functioning of the entities 
to which they lend, with nominee directors on the board, backed by technical 
and managerial expertise in the development bank’s offices; 
iii.  Allow for the possibility that policy banks can encourage commercial banks, 
normally concerned with short term lending for working capital purposes, to 
undertake long-term lending as well. They can do this by offering guarantees as 
well as refinance facilities at reasonable rates against long-term loans provided 
by commercial banks for specific purposes. By reducing default and liquidity 
risks for the commercial banks, such facilities enable them to play a role in the 
market for long-term funds; 
iv.   Provide policy banks with forms of financial support – such as long-term funds 
from the central banks (financed out of their “profits”), long-term  loans or 
equity contributions from the government, loans from multilateral and bilateral 
agencies guaranteed by the government, and  concessions such as the grant of 
tax -free status – to ensure the viability of these institutions and the efficacy of 
their operations. This is necessary because, given the role that development 
banks are expected to play, it is difficult for them to compete with commercial 
banks and other financial intermediaries to mobilise funds from the market. The 
cost and short-term maturities of such liabilities make it difficult to realise the 
objectives for which these institutions are established in the first instance;  
v.   Ensure that development banks leverage their lending to monitor their clients 
and direct them to adopt technologies, marketing and managerial practices that 
would render them viable. 
Cooperatives  
Another channel to deliver credit as part 
of a system of inclusive finance is 
cooperative banks incorporating of 
members from the target community, set 
up with state aid and supported by state 
subsidy. Cooperatives have a long history 
and have been extremely successful in 
many contexts. They have also played an 
important role in developed country 
contexts, as illustrated by the credit union 
movement in the United States (Box 8). 
Cooperative banks were promoted, based 
partly on the view that the systems and 
procedures of traditional banks were 
determined by the needs of urban 
industrial and business financing, making 
them inadequate agencies for covering the last mile in rural areas. Their methods are 
not always appropriate for banking with the poor, which involves intensive 
relationship banking that permits the use of social collateral. Dependent largely on 
documentation-based appraisal, they are inadequate in environments where lending 
Box 8 
Credit Unions in the United States 
Credit unions played an important role in 
development in the United States. Credit 
unions are member-owned organizations 
that offer higher interest rates on savings 
and charge lower interest rates on loans 
compared with commercial banks. The 
credit unions return any profit to their 
members at the end of each year, and they 
operate as non-profits, paying no taxes on 
earnings that are retained or paid out  to 
members. This tax-exempt status helped the 
expansion and growth of credit unions, 
despite the competition from commercial 
banks. 27 
needs to be based more on trust and production related appraisals. This makes 
cooperative banks, constituted with target group members, much better vehicles for 
delivering credit to small and marginal farmers, and those who have little or no 
productive assets. A cooperative bank component to a system of inclusive finance is, 
therefore, imperative. 
However, while formally cooperatives are democratic institutions with participatory 
management and peer-group monitoring, in practice local class hierarchies and 
patronage structures result in their managements being dominated by powerful rural 
interest groups. Since their constitution and structure makes them less accountable to 
oversight agencies in the  formal banking sector, there can be significant failures of 
governance. This substantially influences their lending decisions, leading even to 
diversion of credit away from the region. In India, for example, cooperative banks are 
known to have financed dubious investments in metropolitan stock markets leading to 
substantial losses. 
Moreover, since these institutions are convenient vehicles for governments to channel 
their development budgets and subsidies, they become the conduit for leakages of 
expenditures targeted at disadvantaged groups. They also serve as conduits to 
distribute political patronage, often resulting in politicians dominating the boards of 
cooperative banks. 
Such problems do not warrant dispensing with cooperatives and the role they can 
play. Governments must enact laws aimed at ensuring the participatory nature of 
managements of cooperative banks and preventing conflicts of interest from marring 
the managements and their practices. They should also create special regulatory 
institutions to monitor these institutions to ensure proper use of funds and the 
sustainability of their finances. 
Micro-finance institutions (MFIs)  
Conventional development banks and cooperatives may not be adequate as a source 
of finance for the poorest. Hence, an often -advocated strategy for ensuring inclusion 
is the promotion of micro -credit through micro-finance institutions. Micro-finance has 
been defined as the provision of diverse financial services (credit, savings, insurance, 
remittances, money transfers, leasing) to poor and low-income people. The case for 
micro-finance is based on the understanding that: 
•  even if a policy of inclusive banking is adopted, the likelihood that the really 
poor will be touched by the formal banking system, including cooperatives, is  
low; 
•  thus, the poorest will be deprived of credit or be dependent on informal 
sources at interest rates that limits their resort to credit to emergencies; 
•  access to individual and household level micro-credit may be crucial to 
ensuring earning opportunities for the majority, since wage employment in 
agriculture and small businesses cannot meet the scale of demand for 
livelihood opportunities, especially in the rural areas, and 
•  they permit the creation of self-help groups, often constituted by women, and 
can be a potent means for social mobilization and women’s empowerment. 28 
Thus, micro-finance should be 
promoted as a complement to formal 
finance and a substitute for informal 
sources of credit in urban and rural 
areas. However, it is necessary to 
address problems confronted by the 
micro-finance movement across the 
developing world. 
There has been an explosion of micro-
credit programmes since the 1990s, 
implemented under various 
institutional arrangements, run by 
NGOs as well as, increasingly, 
government organizations, often 
supported by bilateral and multilateral 
donor assistance and advice (Box 9). 
Many of these experiments have been 
successful in displacing exploitative, 
informal private sector creditors, 
meeting demands for credit to finance 
consumption and emergency 
expenditures and, in some cases, even 
small investments. 
There is much praise of the pro -poor consequences of many of these programmes. 
These are targeted at specific sectors with a preponderance of the poor, provide credit 
without collateral on the basis of peer group guarantees, and on occasion, combine 
credit with other technical services. In Bangladesh, for example, micro-credit has 
been seen as the favoured alternative means of credit delivery to the poor. That 
country was a leader in attempting to use micro-credit as a solution to the credit 
access problem for the poor created by financial liberalisation, with the Grameen 
Bank becoming a model for similar experiments elsewhere in the developing world. 
The average annual disbursement of loans from these programmes is estimated to be 
over Taka 5000 crores (US$0.9 billion), far exceeding the total rural operations of the 
nationalised banks and specialised banking institutions taken together. Impressed by 
the growth of the movement, the government has even attempted to centralise flows 
of micro-credit through a public sector organisation created for the purpose, the Palli 
Karma Sahayak Foundation (PKSF) (Osmani et al., 2003).  
With hindsight, it is clear that, despite successes, there are a number of problems that 
plague micro-finance in developing countries. Besides differences in the actual extent 
of coverage of the rural poor and contribution to poverty alleviation, some common 
problems are: 
•  excessively high rates of interest, making successful lending for productive 
investment near impossible;  
•  inability to reach, in a financially viable way, the really poor;
4 
                                                  
4 In addition, as United Nations (2006:37) notes: “As crucial as the microcredit revolution has been, it 
has not provided the full range of credit products needed by poor people. The one-size -fits-all working 
Box 9 
The Spread of Microfinance  
At the end of 2004, there were 3,044 MFIs in 
developing countries making microloans to 
over 92 million clients. Of these, 66.5 million 
were classified as among the “poorest” people, 
55.6 million of them women. Though 
concentrated in Asia, which accounts for 88 per 
cent of all reported loan clients in developing 
countries, significant numbers of MFIs operate 
elsewhere: 994 in Africa, 388 in Latin America 
and the Caribbean and 34 in the Middle East. 
While MFIs may lend very small amounts, 
they can be very large organizations. Eight 
individual institutions and three networks each 
served one million or more clients. Adding the 
41 individual institutions that ser ved between 
100,000 and a million clients would account 
for almost 84 per cent of all poor clients 
served. The rest were serviced by the 
remaining 3,000 MFIs, the overwhelming 
majority serving fewer than 2,500 clients each. 
Extracted from: United Nations, 2006:13-15. 29 
•  donor dependence, and  
•  financial non-sustainability. 
Part of the reason for the high interest rates is the extremely high transaction costs 
associated with micro -finance ventures. As is widely recognised (United Nations, 
2006), the cost of disbursing, managing and collecting instalment payments on many 
tiny loans, often at frequent intervals, is significantly more costly than for fewer loans 
of larger amounts. In addition, reaching poor clients requires more staff time and 
personal interaction, implying additional costs. Staff time is increased because of 
illiteracy, the need to explain borrower and lender responsibilities and obligations, 
and the travel distances over poor infrastructure. Further, banking for the poor is a 
high-risk activity, given the vulnerability and high failure rates of units/activities set 
up by such borrowers. 
Promotion of micro-finance, despite these higher transaction costs, is warranted 
because MFIs can provide the close  supervision and support to borrowers that 
mainstream financial institutions cannot afford. They serve as micro-development 
banks, offering extension services to the poor, and as an effective instrument to bring 
the illiterate rural poor into the cash economy and to impart some managerial and 
financial discipline to them. It is the lack of such discipline which perpetuates the 
view that lending to the poor is a mere “handout”, based on instances of failure or 
lack of sustainability of traditional state- or d onor-financed rural credit schemes 
operated through banks. 
However, it would be utopian to believe that this role of MFIs can be extended to a 
level where they provide credit for all viable projects on a self-financing basis. The 
higher transaction costs h ave to be covered by some combination of higher-than -
market interest rates and interest subsidies. The larger the subsidy and lower the 
interest, the higher the possibility that micro-credit can be used for financing projects 
involving fixed -investment. But, since micro-credit is also used for non-productive 
purposes, the presence or extent of the subsidy should be calibrated according to the 
purpose for which credit is sought. Peer-group monitoring can help with such 
calibration. This will also serve to discourage excess borrowing for non-productive 
uses. To exploit these potential features of micro-finance for social benefit, the state 
and the donor community should consider supporting it with subsidies. If no subsidies 
and transfers from the state or other donors are available to render micro-financial 
services a feasible source of capital for productive investment, successfully scaling up 
of donor-driven experiments will prove difficult.  
Micro -finance has to be viewed as a form of small-scale development banking  – 
requiring heavy effective subsidies even while charging relatively high interest rates – 
rather than as having any connection with commercial banking. Backed by some 
donors, commercial banking institutions, seeing MFIs as a potential source of 
competition, have sought to dilute this role of micro -finance as a complementary, 
separate channel of provision of finance with its own requirements. They have 
promoted the view that MFIs should, over a period of time, graduate into more 
                                                                                                                                                
capital loan entails inflexible terms, rigid loan cycles and amounts that are only suitable for 
microbusinesses with high turnover or those that produce regular weekly or monthly cash flows. The 
inflexibility of the product limits its usefulness to people who operate businesses with irregular cash 
flows, or require higher (or lower) amounts to support their businesses. Customers may use the 
inappropriate credit product, may not qualify for it, or may simply decide not to borrow.” 30 
diversified non-bank financial companies or serve as delivery mechanisms for the 
formal financial system in a new form of “agency banking”. Thus, commercial 
financial providers have begun to offer certain services to this market and some banks 
have opened full-service micro-finance operations. Not surprisingly, many NGO 
MFIs, lacking adequate resources, often resort to bank loans, and many have 
borrowed to an extent that threatens their viability. To repeat, micro -finance and 
micro-credit institutions must be seen as complementary to, but separate from, formal 
financial institutions and not embryonic forms of formal financial institutions.  
But MFIs can learn from formal institutions and adopt certain kinds of professional 
practices. For example, many MFIs are not sufficiently equipped to undertake proper 
risk -assessment, and need to be trained to do so. Often, reporting systems are also not 
adequate, which is a problem because of the lack of accountability of many micro-
finance groups. State support for improving management and accounting practices 
must therefore be provided. 
The problems afflicting micro-finance institutions notwithstanding, the evidence does 
suggest that the poor can be served successfully with appropriate organizational and 
managerial innovations, despite the higher cost of small-scale transactions. There is 
also evidence that the use of information and communications technology can bring 
down the costs of many of the transactions  and the cost differential involved in 
serving poor customers (United Nations, 2006). Moreover, while many micro-finance 
providers are, or have been, subsidized in one form or another, there are a number 
which operate independent of subsidy and are self-sustaining. 
Nevertheless, while efforts to improve the system of micro-credit as a second channel 
must continue, there is no alternative to strengthening the formal credit system to deal 
with the challenges faced in predominantly rural developing economies with a high 
incidence of poverty. The aim of financial intervention is not to prevent the creation 
of a modern financial sector. Rather, its primary aim is to expand the reach of the 
formal financial sector, so as to enable the state to use the financial structure as an 
instrument of development. It is for this reason that development  practitioners 
increasingly call for a paradigm shift involving a change from an emphasis on micro -
finance to one on inclusive finance (United Nations, 2006). 
Table 3 summarises some of the main financial policy options that can be used to 
realize a process of more broad-based and equitable growth. 
Learning from historical experience 
Policies to ensure the flow of financial savings to key sectors from a development 
point of view did not originate in developing countries. Financial structures in late-
industrializing countries like Germany and Japan emerged or were fashioned to deal 
with the difficulties associated with late industrialization. Capital requirements for 
entry in most areas were high, because technology for factory production had evolved 
in a capital-intensive direction from its primitive industrial revolution level. 
Competition from established international producers meant that firms had to be 
supported with protection and finance to survive long periods of low capacity 
utilization during which they could seek a foothold in domestic and world markets 
and become competitive producers. Not surprisingly, late industrializers created 
strongly regulated and even predominantly state-controlled financial markets aimed at 
mobilizing savings and using the  intermediary function to influence the size and 
structure of investment. Despite their differences, the hausbank system in Germany, 31 
the lead bank system in Japan and the financial system in the Republic of  Korea, 
epitomized this feature. Their financial systems were characterized by directed credit 
policies and differential interest rates, and the provision of investment support for the 
nascent industrial class in the form of equity, credit and low interest rates. 
Based on the roles played by Crédit Mobilier in France and the ‘universal banks’ in 
Germany, Gerschenkron (1962:13) argued that the creation of “financial organisations 
designed to build thousands of miles of railroads, drill mines, erect factories, pierce 
canals, construct ports and modernise cities” was hugely transformative. Financial 
firms based on the old wealth were typically rentier in nature and limited themselves 
to floatations of government loans and foreign exchange transactions. The new 
financial firms were “devoted to railroadisation and industrialisation of the country” 
and, in the process, influenced the behaviour of old wealth as well. 33 34 The function played by these institutions  is noteworthy. The banks, according to 
Gerschenkron, substituted for the absence of a number of elements crucial to 
industrialization: “In Germany, the various incompetencies  of the individual 
entrepreneurs were offset by the device of splitting the entrepreneurial function: the 
German investment banks – a powerful invention, comparable in economic effect to 
that of the steam engine – were in their capital-supplying functions a substitute for the 
insufficiency of the previously created wealth willingly placed at the disposal of 
entrepreneurs. But they were also a substitute for entrepreneurial deficiencies. From 
their central vantage points of control, the banks participated actively in shaping the 
major – and sometimes even not so major – decisions of the individual enterprises. It 
was they who often mapped out a firm’s paths of growth, conceived far-sighted plans, 
decided on major technological and locational innovations, and arranged for mergers 
and capital increases” (Gerschenkron, 1968:137). 
From a development point of view, this experience implies that financial institutions 
must not only serve to direct credit at pre-specified interest rates, but must adopt a 
pro-active role in the decision making of the entities they finance. To do so, they need 
to mobilize the best talent  – technological expertise, managerial competence and 
marketing skill – to facilitate the conversion of savings channelled to farms, firms and 
individuals into investment in productive and socially high-yielding assets. 
When serving this role, financial intermediaries move up the scale from being a mere 
pool of savings, as they are conventionally seen, to being a pool of knowledge and 
expertise, allowing them to overcome the coordination failures that afflict atomistic 
decision-makers in market-based systems. 
VI.  AUTONOMY AND REGULATION 
Pre-empting financial fragility 
Besides pursuing the objectives of growth and equity, financial policies should be 
geared to ensuring the stability and sustainability of the financial system. Failures in 
financial markets affect not only the institution concerned, but other sectors of the 
economy. In some instances, this could have systemic effects. Thus, when speculative 
bubbles lead to financial crises, they squeeze liquidity and result in distress sales of 
assets and deflation with adverse impact on employment and living standards. To 
prevent such effects, governments often resort to costly bailouts, which too have 
implications for growth and equity. 
Failure can never be abolished, but regulation can help to reduce the recurrence of 
crisis. The best model of regulation remains the framework adopted in the U nited 
States, in response to the wave of bank failures during 1920-32. Its anchor was the 
Banking Act of 1933 (the Glass-Steagall Act), which imposed a strong regulatory 
framework that developed to have five dimensions: 
•  First, it created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) for federal 
insurance of deposits. From the point of view of the small depositor, all banks 
became identical and completely secure, regardless of their balance sheets. 
•  Second, it set limitations on interest payments on deposits. Interest was 
prohibited for demand deposits and ceilings introduced for time and savings 
deposits. With these controls, the principal financial intermediaries could not 
attract depositors with higher interest rates, so that there was no direct  
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imperative to invest in assets offering high returns that are also risky and 
prone to default. 
•  Third, together with the McFadden-Pepper Act of 1927, Glass-Steagall 
provided for entry barriers that limited ‘excessive’ competition resulting from 
the previous regime of  free banking. It reinforced the individual states’ 
authority to restrict inter-state banking and limit bank holding companies and 
other instruments of concentration. 
•  Fourth, it restricted the operations of banks. There were restrictions on 
investments that banks could make, principally limiting them to loan provision 
and to purchases of government securities. There were prohibitions on the 
activities of banks or their affiliates, with a ban on underwriting securities and 
serving as an insurance underwriter or agency, and commercial activities. The 
restrictions also included a 10 per cent limit on outstanding exposure to a 
single borrower and limits on lending to sensitive sectors like real estate.
5 This 
was clearly aimed at ensuring that the moral hazard associated with deposit 
insurance did not lead to risky investments and at pre-empting the practice of 
financing losses elsewhere in the financial sector with bank equity.  
•  Finally, a system of regulating solvency was put in place, involving periodic 
examination of bank financial records and informal guidelines relating to the 
ratio of shareholder capital to total assets  
This model served the U nited  States extremely well for over three decades. 
Macroeconomic developments in the 1970s and after launched a period of accelerated 
“financial innovation”, requiring its revision, but it remains substantially relevant for 
developing countries. Governments must seek to remain as close to this model as 
possible. 
Insofar as circumstances warrant a deviation, there must be special provisions to deal 
with the risks involved. These should include: 
•  restrictions on banks lending to firms or investing in securities in which the 
owners/directors of the bank have an interest; 
•  restrictions on the volume of lending to and proportionate exposure to 
sensitive sectors like the stock and real estate market, and 
•  monitoring and reduction of high spreads between deposit rates and 
lending/investment returns, which provide evidence of limited competition or 
excessively risky investments. 
Such provisions can moderate the tendency to undertake unnecessary risks in search 
of high returns. Typical examples are lending for investments in stocks or real estate. 
Loans to these sectors can be at extremely high interest rates because the returns in 
these sectors are extremely volatile and can touch extremely high levels. Since banks 
accept real estate or securities as collateral, borrowing to finance speculative 
investments in stock or real estate can spiral. This type of activity thrives because of 
the belief that losses if any can be transferred to the lender through default, and 
                                                  
5 Real estate loans secured by first liens could not exceed total savings deposits of a bank or, if greater, 
its unimpaired paid-up capital and surplus.  
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lenders are confident of government support in case of crisis. This could feed a 
speculative spiral that can, in time lead to a collapse of the bubble and bank failures. 
These kinds of tendencies need to be curbed also because they affect real investment. 
As the maximum returns to productive investment in agriculture and manufacturing 
are limited, there is a limit to what borrowers would be willing to pay to finance such 
investment. Thus, despite the fact that social returns to agricultural and manufacturing 
investment are higher than for stocks and real estate, and despite the contribution such 
investment can make to growth and poverty alleviation, credit at the required rate may 
not be available. 
Financial sector supervision and regulation  
In addition to such measures, governments must implement strict regulations with 
regard to accounting standards, disclosure norms and governance structures. They 
should also put in place institutions responsible for prudential regulation of markets, 
involving a mix of monitoring of individual transactions, ensuring adoption of 
appropriate risk-management systems, routine scrutiny of company accounts, 
enforcement of guidelines to prevent conflict of interest and assessment of company 
adherence to capital adequacy norms. It must be noted that these forms of regulation 
do not fully insure against fragility. Advocates of freer and more open financial 
markets claim that capital adequacy norms and prudential regulation can deal with 
these problems. However, instances of increased and periodic financial failure suggest 
otherwise, as does the growing evidence of conflicts of interest, accounting fraud and 
market manipulation even in the well developed and ostensibly transparent and well 
regulated United States market. 
Market-based financial systems are fragile and prone to failure, and regulation cannot 
fully redress this. Systems of social regulation and control have the advantage that 
regulation is built into the very structure that serves to promote development. But 
even then, since government-appointed agents are responsible for supervision, 
monitoring and scrutiny, the perennial question as to who will monitor the monitor 
remains. Particular agents may misuse their position, indulge in favouritism and/or 
corruption, and government regulation may fail. The ways of dealing with this 
problem is not merely to return to the market with all its deficiencies, but to evolve 
institutional mechanisms to monitor agents in the public sector. Central elements of 
such mechanisms must be participatory governance  and accountability to 
democratically constituted bodies. 
VII.  ON LIBERALIZING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
The policy conclusions emerging from the above discussion are not just relevant from 
the point of view of pro-actively framing financial policies, but should also serve to 
correct or stall policies that militate against the objectives of growth, equity and 
financial stability.  
In recent years, however, processes of financial liberalization in developing countries 
have challenged many of the features of financial systems that are favourable from a 
developmental point of view. These processes are justified on the grounds that the 
interventionist financial policies adopted by developing countries to accelerate 
growth, improve distribution and avoid fragility, have resulted in “financial 
repression”, involving low and even negative interest rates and distortions that divert  
38 
financial flows away from the best, high-return projects (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 
1973).  
There are a number of ways in which interventionist policies are seen to have 
adversely affected growth (Fry, 1997). To start with, low interest rates resulting from 
regulation are seen to affect adversely the level of savings, and therefore investment, 
by encouraging current consumption. Second, low interest rates offered by financial 
intermediaries are seen as encouraging direct investments by savers rather than 
through intermediaries. Given the scale economies associa ted with the pooling of 
resources and the greater ability of financial intermediaries to identify the best 
projects and monitor the functioning of borrowers, this process is seen to reduce the 
efficiency of investment allocation. Third, since interest rates are low, the number of 
projects looking for funding tends to be large, resulting in the possibility that some or 
many low-quality projects are funded at the expense of better projects. To boot, on 
average, projects tend to be more capital intensive because of the lower costs of 
capital, with adverse employment effects. That is, low interest rates could result in 
inferior investment choices. Finally, since returns to lenders are low and often fixed, 
their lending practices are not driven by potential yields of projects financed, but 
influenced by extraneous factors such as political pressures, loan size or private 
benefits to bankers. 
The adverse effects of these factors on growth, it is argued, are made worse as 
“repressive” financial policies limit the extent of financial deepening and 
intermediation. This is seen as inimical to development, based on the view that there 
is a strong positive relationship between financial deepening/intermediation and 
growth (Levine, 1997).  
39 
A logical corollary of the financial 
repression argument is that interest rates 
should be freed, financial markets and 
institutions liberalized and markets 
allowed to determine the allocation of 
credit. As has been pointed out by a 
number of economists (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981; Arestis, 2005), the 
conceptual bases of these arguments are 
questionable. In particular, they are 
based on the assumption that 
liberalization delivers “competitive” 
financial markets, in which financial 
institutions compete to attract savings 
and identify the best borrowers. 
However, competitive markets do not 
always deliver the desired results. This 
is because what matters is not the 
number of firms that accept deposits but 
their willingness to offer credit, and this 
may be limited for other reasons even 
when there are a large number of banks 
in a country (Box 10). 
In practice, liberalization delivers 
unanticipated results. As early as 1985, 
Diaz-Alejandro (1986) detailed why 
efforts in Latin America in the 1970s to 
follow the recommendations of the financial repression literature and “free domestic 
capital markets from usury laws and other alleged government-induced distortions” 
had “yielded by 1983 domestic financial  sectors characterized by widespread 
bankruptcies, massive government interventions or nationalization of private 
institutions (to save financial firms and pre-empt adverse effects), and low domestic 
savings.” 
Rather than encouraging greater competition, there was a strengthening of 
oligopolistic power through the mergers of financial intermediaries or association of 
financial intermediaries and non-financial corporations. Financial intermediaries that 
were a part of these conglomerates allocated credit in favour of companies belonging 
to the group, which was by no means a more efficient allocation than could have 
occurred under directed-credit policies of the government.
6 
Further, financial liberalization did not result in intermediation of financial assets with 
long-term maturities, with deposits and loans of less than six months’ duration 
dominating. The Southern Cone experience of the late 1970s and early 1980s suggest 
that deregulation did not lead to stable interest rates, that interest rates on the whol e 
could remain very high and way above “reasonable estimates of the socially optimal 
shadow real interest rate.” 
                                                  
6 In India, nationalisation of the bigger private commercial banks in 1969 was partly motivated by the 
need to prevent the diversion of household savings to companies linked to the banks or their directors. 
Box 10  
Financial Strategies  
Can Lead to Credit Rationing 
In India, following financial sector reforms, 
the credit-deposit ratio of commercial banks 
declined substantially from 65.2 per cent in 
1990-91 to 49.9 per cent in 2003-4, despite a 
substantial increase in the credit-creating 
capacity of banks through periodic reductions 
in reserve ratios. This may have been the 
result of a decline in demand for credit from 
creditworthy borrowers. However, one fact 
appears to question this argument: the 
decrease in the credit-deposit ratio has been 
accompanied by a corresponding increase in 
the proportion of risk-free government 
securities in the banks’ major earning assets 
i.e. loans and advances, and investments. The 
investment in government securities as a 
percentage of total earning assets for the 
commercial banking system as a whole was 
26.1 per cent in 1990-91. But it increased to 
32.4 per cent in 2003-04. This points to the 
fact that lending to the commercial sector 
may have been displaced by investments in 
government securities offering relatively 
high, near risk-free returns (Chandrasekhar 
and Ray, 2005).  
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Finally, despite short booms in stock markets, there was little mobilization of new 
capital or capital for new ventures. In fact, small investors tended to withdraw from 
markets because of allegations of manipulation and fraud, and erstwhile areas of long-
term investments supported by state intervention tended to disappear. While financial 
liberalization did encourage new kinds of financial savings, total domestic savings did 
not increase in many cases, and expansion of available financial savings was the 
result of inflow of foreign capital. 
Despite the repetition of this experience across the developing world since the early 
1970s, many developing countries have opted for similar policies, either necessitated 
by conditionalities imposed by donors when countries turn to them for emergency 
balance of payments finance, or voluntarily in the hope of attracting large capital 
flows into their economies. That is, there is a strong correspondence between 
unavoidable or voluntary dependence on capital flows and processes of financial 
liberalization. 
These processes militate against the adoption of financial policies appropriate for 
development and even dismantle financial structures that are suitable from a 
development point of view, as discussed above. There are three broad effects from the 
process of financial liberalization: 
•  it opens the country to new forms and larger volumes of international financial 
flows, in order to attract part of the substantially increased flows of financial 
capital to the so -called “emerging markets” since the late-1970s; 
•  to facilitate these inflows, it liberalizes, to differing degrees, the terms 
governing outflows of foreign exchange in the form of current account 
investment income payments and capital account transfers for permitted 
transactions, and 
•  to attract these flows, it transforms the structure of the domestic financial 
sector and the nature and operations of domestic financial firms such that it 
makes the financial system resemble that adopted over the last three decades 
at much higher levels of development in countries like the United States and 
the United Kingdom 
It is now widely accepted that the first two of these, i nvolving liberalization of 
controls on inflows and outflows of capital respectively, have resulted in an increase 
in financial fragility in developing countries, making them prone to periodic financial 
and currency crises. Analyses of individual instances  of crises have tended to 
conclude that the nature and timing of these crises had much to do with the shift to a 
more liberal and open financial regime. What is more, crises rarely lead to controls on 
capital inflows and reduced dependence on them. Rather,  adjustment strategies 
emphasize further financial liberalization, resulting in a history of periodic financial 
failure. 
But what requires special attention are the structural effects (elaborated in Box 11) of 
liberalization on the ability of countries to use the financial system as an instrument in 
a national development strategy. As might be expected from the above discussion, the 
empirical experience with financial liberalization is that it results in: 
•  declining credit-deposit ratios or reduced credit provision; 
•  “diversion” of credit to sensitive sectors, such as the stock market and real 
estate, as well as to consumer finance;   
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•  greater emphasis on “investments” in instruments such as government 
securities or certificates of deposit issued by corporations; 
•  a preference for commissions and fee-based incomes rather than returns from 
interest rate spreads; 
•  an unwillingness of banks to perform their role as the principal risk bearers in 
the system, with a market preference to use innovative instruments to transfer 
credit risk to institutions and investors less equipped to assess such risks, and 
•  a greater degree of financial exclusion, with a growing concentration of credit 
and investment in a few favoured sectors and its direction to larger clients. 
A set of country studies in Sub-Saharan Africa by Cornia and Lipumbia (1999) for 
UNU/WIDER found that a decade or more of financial liberalization notwithstanding, 
the removal of financial repression had not increased the volume of credit available to 
the small-scale urban sector and to rural areas. This has occurred, despite the fact that 
the number of private banks had grown, and the share of credit allocated to the private  
sector had  increased while that of the public sector had  decreased. What is more, real 
lending  rates ha d risen  sharply while deposit rates had declined  and spreads had 
soared markedly. As a result, s avings and investment rates had not increased. The 
increase in the number of banks had not markedly reduced the concentration of bank 
deposits and assets. Most of the loans  continued to be of short-term maturity, 
financing mainly trade. Long-term finance for agricultural and industrial development 
was not available. The majority of the population working in smallholder farms and 
small- and medium-scale en terprises  had no access to credit. A nd, with limited 
supervision from understaffed   central banks and weak regulatory framewo rks, the 
rapid creation of new financial  institutions ha d been accompanied by greater 
instability and a rise in the number of bank failures. The results of the policies seem to 
be the same when applied to both small and large as well as less and more developed 
among developing countries.  
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Box 11  
The Structural Consequences of Financial Liberalization 
There are a number of aspects and consequences of financial liberalization as implemented in 
practice. To start with, it involves reducing or removing controls on interest rates or rates of 
return charged or earned by financial agents. This encourages competition between similarly 
placed financial firms to attract depositors on the one hand, and entice potential borrowers on 
the other. Competition not only takes non-price forms, but leads to price competition that 
squeezes spreads and forces firms to depend on volume to profit. This often leads to 
diversification of activity away from socially relevant, but privately less profitable areas. 
The second feature of financial liberalization is that it removes or dilutes controls on the entry 
of new financial firms, subject to their meeting pre-specified norms with regard to capital 
investments. This aspect of liberalization inevitably applies to both domestic and foreign 
financial firms, and caps on equity that can be held by foreign investors in domestic financial 
firms are gradually raised or done away with. Easier conditions of entry do not automatically 
increase competition in the conventional sense, since liberalization also involves freedom for 
domestic and foreign players to acquire financial firms and extends to permissions provided 
to foreign institutional investors, pension funds and hedge funds to invest in equity and debt 
markets. This often triggers a process of consolidation that creates or restores a nexus 
between large oligopolistic players and financial intermediaries with attendant i mplications. 
Thirdly, liberalization involves a reduction in controls over investments that can be 
undertaken by financial agents. Financial agents can be permitted to invest in areas they were 
not permitted to enter previously. Most regulated financial systems seek to keep separate the 
different segments of the financial sector such as banking, merchant banking, mutual funds 
and insurance. Agents in one segment were not permitted to invest in another for fear that 
conflicts of interest could affect business practices adversely. Financial liberalization breaks 
down the regulatory walls separating these sectors, leading, in the final analysis, to the 
emergence of so-called “universal banks”, or financial supermarkets. The consequent ability 
of financial agents to straddle multiple financial activities implies that the linkages between 
different financial markets tend to increase, with developments in any one market affecting 
others to a far greater degree than previously. Besides increasing the probability of failure, 
this influences lending and investment practices in ways unsuited to broad-based national 
development. 
Fourth, liberalization involves relaxation of the rules governing the kinds of financial 
instruments that can be issued and acquired. Financial  instruments allow agents to share 
financial gains and risks to differing degrees, where the gains are incomes and asset price 
appreciation and the risks are default on interest payments and amortization, interest rate 
changes or depreciation of asset values. These assets can be issued directly by those looking 
for capital for productive investments, or by intermediaries expecting to obtain part of the 
incomes in return for bearing part of the risk. This aggravates the tendencies noted above. 
Fifth, in many  contexts, liberalization involves withdrawal of the state from financial 
intermediation, with the conversion of “development banks” into regular banks and 
privatization of the publicly owned banking system, on the grounds that their presence is not 
conducive to the dominance of market signals in the allocation of capital. 
Sixth, financial liberalization eases conditions for the participation of both firms and investors 
in the stock market by diluting or removing listing conditions, by providing freedom in the 
pricing of new issues, by permitting greater freedom to intermediaries such as brokers, and by 
relaxing conditions on borrowing against shares and investing borrowed funds in the market. 
Finally, rather than regulation through direct intervention, liberalization involves shifting to a 
regime of voluntary adherence to statutory guidelines with regard to capital adequacy, 
accounting norms and related practices, with the central bank’s role being that of supervision 
and monitoring.  
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Since market forces mediate the realisation of these outcomes, financial liberalisation 
policies, often adopted on the grounds that the financial proliferation resulting from 
such liberalisation is an unqualified good, can result in an aggravation of the problem 
of financial exclusion (Box 12). 
As Mkandawire (1999) notes,  Ffrench-Davis' argument for Latin America has 
resonance in the African case when he argues that “what is needed is an institutional 
framework that encompasses a vigorous long-term segment of the financial market, in 
order to finance productive investment. In addition, low- and medium-income sectors, 
which typically su ffer from the social segmentation of the capital market, need easier 
access to capital.  They need this market to deal with contingencies, to invest in 
training and to promote the development and modernization of productive activities” 
(Ffrench-Davis, 1994:239).  
Finally, greater freedom to invest, including in sensitive sectors such as real estate and 
stock markets, ability to increase exposure to particular sectors and individual clients, 
and increased regulatory forbearance, all lead to increased instances of financ ial 
failure. In addition, by institutionally linking different segments of financial markets 
                                                  
7  Some caution must be exercised when interpreting these figures. There is reason to believe that a 
substantial part of what was occurring was a transfer of savings and credit provision from the informal 
to the formal credit system. 
Box 12 
Financial Liberalisation and Financial Exclusion 
The experience of a small, land-locked Least Developed Country like Nepal illustrates how 
financial liberalisation can result in financial exclusion. After the liberalisation of Nepal’s 
financial system, the evidence (Deraniyagala et al., 2003) points to an eight-fold increase in 
deposit mobilisation by the banking sector during the 1990s (from Rs 22 billion in 1990 to 
Rs 181 billion in July 2001).
7 Deposit mobilisation by finance companies also increased 
substantially. As a ratio to GDP, bank deposits increased from 19 per cent in 1985 to 43 per 
cent in 2001. Deposits with non-bank financial institutions also increased from 0.5 per cent 
of GDP in 1995 to 4.6 per cent in 2001. The consequent increase in financial intermediation 
is reflected in the fact that the ratio of financial assets to GDP rose from 29.3 per cent in 
1985 to 32.5 per cent in 1990 and a huge 84.3 per cent in 2001. Financial deepening and 
increased financial intermediation obviously increased credit provided by the financial 
system substantially. Commercial banks' credit to the private sector rose from 8.7 percent of 
GDP in 1985 to 29.4 percent in 2001. 
This process was not accompanied by adequate provision of credit to the poverty-sensitive 
sectors. Of the credit provided by commercial banks in 2001, only 9 per cent went to the 
agricultural sector, although 80 per cent of the country’s population was involved in 
cultivating some land and 50 per cent derived their incomes from agriculture, making it 
extremely important in terms of livelihoods and poverty reduction. On the other hand, credit 
to industry increased from 18.8 per cent in 1985 to 45 per cent in 2001. Part of this increase 
reflected a shift from the commercial sector, whose share fell from 44 to 33 per cent over 
the same years, but a shift away from agriculture was also responsible. Further, small 
borrowers must have suffered discrimination as 85 per cent of formal sector lending is 
based on collateral. The evidence indicates that despite financial consolidation, not more 
than a fifth of borrowing households in Nepal are covered by institutional finance. 
This trend is not surprising as liberalization has seen the rise to dominance of the private 
financial sector. The ratio of private sector credit to total credit rose from 68.5 per cent in 
1985 to 76.2 per cent in 1990 and to an overwhelming 92.5 per cent in 2001.  
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by permitting the emergence of universal banks or financial supermarkets, the 
liberalization process increases the degree of entanglement of different agents within 
the financial system and increases the impact of financial failure of entities in any one 
segment of the financial system on agents elsewhere in the system. 
The implication for governments is clear. If the intention is to put in place financial 
policies that promote growth, privilege stability and ensure inclusion, an emphasis on 
financial liberalization as a panacea for problems in the functioning and impact of the 
financial sector should be abjured. 
VIII. FOREIGN SAVINGS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
Financial liberalization is often driven by the desire of developing country 
governments to attract large volumes of foreign capital inflows, especially purely 
financial flows. It is often argued that access to foreign savings in the form of capital 
flows reduces the pressure on developing country governments to extract and allocate 
domestic savings, reducing the need for intervention that may go awry. Access to 
foreign finance  – in the form of grants, debt and foreign portfolio and direct 
investment – relaxes the constraints domestically available real resources set on the 
potential rate of growth of the system. Foreign exchange, being a “fungible” asset, 
can be used to alter the structure of domestic supply through imports. Depending on 
how foreign exchange resources are deployed, they can overcome domestic supply 
constraints, such as a wage-goods, or a capital goods, constraint, by resorting to 
imports. On the financial side, these resources reduce the need to use measures such 
as taxation to restrain the consumption of  particular commodities by particular 
groups, in order to mobilize surpluses needed to finance long-term development. 
Further, inasmuch as foreign “savings”,  in the form of foreign aid or foreign 
borrowing are accessed directly by the state  they can be allocated in line with the 
preferences of the state and in keeping with its strategy of development. 
However, for most developing countries, the volume, pattern and direction of foreign 
capital flows cannot be chosen, but are exogenously given by the political  choices of 
donor governments, the lending strategies of multilateral agencies, the preferences of 
private creditors and investors and the state of play in international financial markets. 
While some of the more developed among developing countries can attract flows of 
the kind they want  some of the time, that flexibility is predicated on creating a 
facilitating environment for autonomous capital flows which often reduces policy 
space and involves a loss of control. 
Foreign finance is not costless. While grants can be considered as pure transfers, their 
volume is small and their share has been declining over time. Other forms of capital 
flows have the following costs and implications:  
•  First, as with domestic debt, foreign debt carries a pre-specified profile of 
interest payment commitments. If the deployment of these resources does not 
result in a rate of nominal output growth greater than the nominal rate of 
interest, resources must be diverted from elsewhere to meet these costs, or 
further debt has to be contracted to meet payment commitments. 
•  Second, these commitments must be met in foreign exchange, necessitating 
the transformation of domestic resources into foreign exchange. To the extent 
that there are specific constraints on the possibilities of transformation through 
trade, reliance on foreign savings can increase external vulnerability.  
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•  Third, access to foreign finance very often comes with conditionalities that 
limit the policy space of the government – that is, relying on foreign finance to 
finance a development strategy may reduce the strategic options available to a 
government, including options relating to financial policy. Official  flows are 
conditional upon the  pursuit of specified monetary, fiscal or other policies. 
Private  flows are implicitly conditional upon  minimizing government 
intervention and the pursuit of market-friendly policies. 
•  Fourth, accessing foreign finance through the foreign direct investment route 
may involve a net foreign exchange outflow in the medium or long term, since 
cumulative flows in the form of repatriated dividends, royalty payments and 
technical fees tend to far exceed the actual inflow of foreign equity and 
reinvested profit share of foreign investors and the foreign exchange earned by 
net exports of the concerned  firm. 
•  Fifth, reliance on debt and portfolio flows from private commercial banks and 
investors may require changing financial sector policies and embracing 
financial openness in a way that reduces the ability of the government to use 
the financial structure as an instrument in a national development strategy. 
•  Finally, reliance on private flows may increase dependence on capital inflows 
that are more volatile, resulting in an increase in external vulnerability and 
increasing the threat of a currency/financial crisis. 
Given these factors, governments cannot assume that their access to foreign savings 
will remain at peak levels attained in the past or will grow at rates recorded in the 
past. A substantial degree of volatility must be provided for. This implies t hat 
excessive dependence on foreign savings to finance current expenditures or 
investments in sectors producing non-tradeables should be abjured. So also should the 
soft option of making foreign savings a substitute for domestic savings. 
Capital flows and financial fragility 
The fact that not all countries receive significant inflows of private capital, which tend 
to be concentrated in a few developing countries, is not necessarily a disadvantage. 
The East Asian crisis of 1997 and the large number of crises that have followed in 
countries such as Russia, Turkey, Brazil and Argentina, have also focused attention on 
other dangers associated with an excessive reliance on fluid finance. Some of these 
dangers are: 
•  First, notwithstanding all talk of efficiency of financial markets, the structure 
of the financial system appears to be such that banks and financial institutions 
from developed countries are not merely prone to over-exposure in individual 
markets, but to exposure reflective of unsound financial practices. A 
combination of moral hazard generated by an implicit guarantee from the state 
that the financial system will be bailed-out in periods of crisis, the herd 
instinct characteristic of imperfect financial markets, and the competitive 
thrust for speculative gains on funds garnered from profit-hungry investors, all 
result in a situation where lending to, and financial investments in, particular 
countries continued well after evidence of high-risk exposure had exceeded 
warranted limits. The corollary is that supply-side factors are likely to result in 
high volatility in financial flows to developing countries, with a surge in such 
flows followed in all likelihood by a sudden collapse.  
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•  Second, a sudden and whimsical turn-around in flows can set off currency 
speculation in the host country which can have extremely severe consequences 
for the exchange rate. Once the speculative fever begins, three factors appear 
to drive down the exchange rate. One, a collapse in investor confidence results 
in a panic withdrawal of funds invested in equity shares and bonds and also 
prevents the rollover of short-term debt by multinational banks. Two, a 
scramble for dollars on the part of domestic banks and corporations with 
imminent dollar commitments, the domestic currency costs of which are rising 
in the wake of depreciation. Three, an increase in speculative operations by 
domestic and international traders cashing in on currency volatility. 
•  Third, with completely unbridled capital flows, it may not be possible for a 
country to control the amount of capital inflow or outflow, and both 
movements can create undesirable consequences. For example, a country 
suddenly chosen as a preferred site for foreign financial investment can 
experience huge inflows which in turn causes the currency to appreciate, thus 
encouraging investment in non-tradeables rather than tradeables, and altering 
domestic relative prices and therefore incentives. Simultaneously, unless the 
inflows of capital are simply (and wastefully) stored up as accumulated 
foreign exchange reserves, they must necessarily be associated with current 
account deficits. In other words, once there is completely free capital flows 
and completely open access to external borrowing by private domestic agents, 
there can be no "prudent" macroeconomic policy; overall domestic balances or 
imbalances will change according to the behaviour of capital flows, which will 
themselves respond to the economic dynamics that they have set into motion. 
•  Fourth, when the surge in capital flows is reversed, a massive liquidity crunch 
and a wave of bankruptcies result in severe deflation, with attendant 
consequences for employment and the standard of living. Asset prices 
collapse, paving the way for international acquisitions of domestic firms at 
low prices denominated in currencies that have substantially depreciated. Such 
acquisitions are, however, encouraged, since they are often the only means to 
restructure and revive cash-strapped corporations. A crisis triggered by finance 
capital becomes the prelude to conquest by international capital in general, 
with substantial changes in the ownership structure of domestic assets without 
much green-field investment. 
•  Finally, the East Asian crisis brought home the fact that financial liberalization 
can generate crises in so-called ‘miracle economies’ as well. 
Managing external debt and capital flows  
Given these features, countries formulating a national development strategy need to: 
i.  make a realistic assessment of potentially available foreign savings and their 
likely composition and direction; 
ii.  assess the domestic and foreign exchange costs of relying on these inflows; 
iii.  choose an appropriate volume and composition of such inflows; 
iv.   design policies to restrict flows to that magnitude and structure, and 
v.  ensure that foreign capital inflows are not a substitute for domestic savings, 
but an additional contribution to investment.  
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These choices establish the external frame in which an appropriate domestic financial 
policy is pursued. 
Managing inflows requires capital controls, or measures that manage the volume, 
composition, or allocation of international private capital flows. They can target either 
inflows or outflows and can be market-based (incentive-based) or involve strict 
quantitative limits. Special reserve requirements for capital flowing in are an example 
of a market-based control. On the other hand, quantitative capital controls involve 
outright bans or quotas on certain investments such as the purchase of equity by 
foreign investors.  
However, as Epstein et al.  (2003)  argue, it can be difficult to draw a clear line 
between prudential domestic financial regulation and capital controls. For example, 
domestic financial regulations that limit the maturity range or specify reporting 
requirements for inflows may influence the composition of international capital flows 
to a country. Thus, prudential domestic financial regulations are another type of 
capital management technique.  
Based on an examination of the diverse capital management techniques (Table 4) 
employed by countries during the 1990s Epstein et al. (2003) argue that: 
•  Capital management techniques can enhance overall financial and currency 
stability, buttress the autonomy of macro and micro-economic policy, and bias 
investment towards the long-term. 
•  The macroeconomic benefits of capital management techniques outweigh the 
often scant evidence of their microeconomic costs. 
•  Capital management techniques work best when they are coherent and 
consistent with a national development vision. 
•  There is no single type of capital management technique that works best for 
all developing countries. 
 
Table 4 
Types and Objectives of Capital Management Techniques  
Employed During the 1990's 
Country  Types of Capital  
Management Techniques 
Objectives of Capital  
Management Techniques 
Chile  Inflows 
*FDI and PI: 1-year residence requirement 
*30% URR 
*Tax on foreign loans: 1.2% per year 
 
Outflows: No significant restrictions 
 
Domestic Financial Regulations: strong 
regulatory measures 
– Lengthen maturity structures and 
stabilize inflows 
 
– Help manage exchange rates to 
maintain export competitiveness 
 
– Protect economy from financial 
instability 
Colombia  Similar to Chile  Similar to Chile  
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Country  Types of Capital  
Management Techniques 
Objectives of Capital  
Management Techniques 
Taiwan POC  Inflows 
(a) Non-residents 
*bank accounts only for domestic spending, 
not financial speculation 
*foreign participation in stock market 
regulated 
*FDI tightly regulated 
(b) Residents 
*regulation on foreign borrowing 
 
Outflows 
  *exchange controls 
 
Domestic Financial Regulations 
*restrictions on lending for real estate and 
other speculative purposes 
– Promote industrialization 
 
– Help manage exchange for 
export competitiveness 
 
– Maintain financial stability and 









*financial institutions can't extend S$ credit 
to non-residents if they are likely to use for 
speculation 
*if they borrow for use abroad, must first 
swap into foreign currency 
 
Domestic Financial Regulations 
*restrictions on creation of swaps, and other 
derivatives that can be used for speculation 
against S$ 
– to prevent speculation against 
Singapore $ 
 
– to support "soft peg" of S$ 
 
– to help maintain export 
competitiveness 
 
– to help insulate Singapore from 








*12 month repatriation waiting period 
*graduated exit levy inversely proportional 




Domestic Financial Regulations 
(a) Non-residents 
*restrict access to ringgit 
(b) Residents 
*encourage to borrow domestically and 
invest 
– to maintain political and 
economic sovereignty 
 
– kill the offshore ringgit market 
 
– shut down offshore share market 
 
– to help reflate the economy 
 
– to help create financial stability 
and insulat e the economy from 
contagion  
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Country  Types of Capital  
Management Techniques 
Objectives of Capital  
Management Techniques 
India  Inflows 
Non-residents 








Domestic Financial Regulations 
*strict limitations on development of 
domestic financial markets 
– support industrial policy 
 
– pursue capital account 
liberalization in an incremental 
and controlled fashion 
 
– insulate domestic economy from 
financial contagion 
 
– preserve domestic savings and 
forex reserves 
 
– help stabilize exchange rate 
China  Inflows 
Non-residents 
*strict regulation on sectoral FDI 
investment 
*regulation of equity investments: 




*no restrictions on repatriation of funds 
*strict limitations on borrowing Chinese 




Domestic Financial Regulations 
*strict limitations on residents and non-
residents 
– support industrial policy 
 
– pursue capital account 
liberalization in incremental and 
controlled fashion 
 
– insulate domestic economy from 
financial contagion 
 
– increase political sovereignty 
 
– preserve domestic savings and 
foreign exchange reserves 
 
– help keep exchange rates at 
competitive levels 
Source: Epstein et al. (2003)  
Even when it comes to attracting foreign direct investment, countries should, at the 
minimum, seek to ensure that foreign exchange investment in and export revenues 
from these units balance the foreign exchange out-go on account of royalties, 
technical fees, dividends and imports. This is a long-term safeguard against external 
vulnerability. A maximal objective of foreign direct investment management should 
be that the employment created as a result of the investment does not fall short of the 
employment displaced by the activities of the unit concerned. 
IX.  CONCLUSIONS 
In sum, the premises on which governments should design financial policies as part of 
a national development strategy are that: 
•  Actually existing markets cannot and do not correspond to any ideal that 
delivers optimal outcomes that no one wants to change;  
•  Far more than markets for most other goods and services, financial markets 
are characterized by features that deliver outcomes that can adversely affect 
growth and aggravate inequities in the sectoral, regional, group and individual 
distribution of the benefits of growth;  
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•  The structure and behaviour of financial systems that are not socially 
controlled and regulated is such that they do not advance the objectives of 
growth and financial inclusion, and 
•  Financial markets left to themselves are prone to failure leading to closure of 
financial firms, losses for consumers and clients, and systemic fragility with 
adverse macroeconomic implications.  
Therefore, intervention is needed to ensure:  
•  availability of credit to viable projects in crucial sectors at sustainable rates,  
•  access to financial markets for all, and  
•  the soundness and stability of the financial system.  
A range of policy options is available to meet each of these objectives. The specific 
mix of policies that governments choose will and s hould vary with the relative 
importance of specific objectives in their own national context, the degree of 
development and diversification of the financial system, and the area of control or 
degree of manoeuvrability of the government concerned. However, the aim should be 
to move over time to a best-practice combination of financial policies that advance 
the objectives of growth, equity and human development. 
It must be noted that the use of any set of policy instruments implies a certain 
presence and role for the state. This raises the issue of government failure, resulting 
not just from errors of judgment, but also from pursuit of individual rather than social 
objectives by government agents, favouritism and corruption. Thus policies must be 
implemented in a framework that is transparent, requires full disclosure and is subject 
to monitoring by bodies that are democratically constituted.   
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